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Is a Strip Club More Harmful Than a Dirty 
Bookstore? Navigating a Circuit Split in Municipal 
Regulation of Sexually Oriented Businesses 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While millions of Americans indulge in pornography,1 most 
people do not want it sold in their neighborhood. As a result, most 
cities have passed zoning regulations that govern where sexually 
oriented businesses may operate. Given First Amendment rights that 
protect sexually explicit “speech,” cities must justify their regulations 
by pointing to studies that link the targeted businesses to a variety of 
societal and economic ills.2 In light of recent federal court decisions, 
however, there is now an open question as to whether those studies, 
some of which cities have relied upon for decades, are good enough 
to survive heightened scrutiny. The continued validity of municipal 
regulations across the country depends on the answer.  
In City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,3 the Supreme 
Court—in upholding a city’s regulation of sexually oriented 
businesses—admonished that, while municipalities must not meet “a 
high bar,”4 they “[cannot] get away with shoddy data or 
reasoning.”5 Instead, the evidence a city relies upon to meet its initial 
burden of showing a substantial interest in the regulation “must 
fairly support the municipality’s rationale for its ordinance.”6 The 
Supreme Court’s admonishment does not purport to suddenly 
 
 1. See Jerry Ropelato, Internet Pornography Statistics, Top Ten Reviews, http:// 
internet-filter-review.toptenreviews.com/internet-pornography-statistics.html#anchor6 (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2008). 
 2. That is, cities must justify regulations in terms of preventing the negative secondary 
effects that have been linked to sexually oriented businesses. For further discussion of 
secondary effects, see infra Part II.B. 
 3. 535 U.S. 425 (2002). 
 4. Id. at 438 (plurality opinion); see also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 
U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986) (“The First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such 
an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already 
generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably 
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.”). 
 5. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438. 
 6. Id. 
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subject a city’s evidence to scrutiny under the framework found in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.;7 instead, a more 
accurate reading might be that a city planner’s observations scribbled 
on the back of a napkin should be rejected. But in the wake of the 
Alameda Books decision, a split has emerged between the Fifth8 and 
the Tenth9 Circuits as to whether the overwhelming majority of 
existing studies constitute “shoddy data or reasoning” when used to 
justify broad zoning ordinances affecting every type of adult 
business. This divide is likely to widen even further as other federal 
circuits inevitably encounter the same question as cities across the 
country rush to drive purveyors of pornography to their fringes and 
beyond. 
The Tenth Circuit has held that on-site and off-site adult 
businesses10 are “reasonably similar businesses,” that will have 
reasonably similar effects, and under the Supreme Court’s standard, 
it is up to the ordinance’s opponent to show otherwise.11 But the 
Fifth Circuit took a decidedly different view, holding that cities 
cannot rely on studies that do not differentiate between on-site 
sexually oriented businesses and off-site sexually oriented 
businesses.12 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that it is not reasonable to 
assume these businesses carry the same negative secondary effects.13  
 
 7. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Daubert decision established the current evidentiary 
standard for scientific evidence admitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under this 
standard all scientific evidence must “not only [be] relevant, but reliable. Id. at 589. Thus, 
before admitting scientific evidence a judge will be required to make “a preliminary assessment 
of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of 
whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Id. at 
592–93. In making this determination the judge must consider, in addition to other factors: 
whether a theory or technique “can be tested”; whether it has been “subjected to peer review 
and publication”; whether there is a “known or potential rate of error”; and whether the 
evidence has been “generally accepted.” Id. at 594. 
 8. See H & A Land Corp. v. City of Kennedale, 480 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2007); Encore 
Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 9. See Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 10. At their core, the difference between these businesses is where patrons consume the 
adult materials for sale—either by viewing the materials “on-site,” as in the case of an adult 
movie theatre, or by purchasing adult products for use “off-site,” as in the case of an adult 
bookstore. For a more thorough explanation of the differences between these two businesses 
see infra Part II.B. 
 11. Doctor John’s, 465 F.3d at 1167–68. 
 12. Encore Videos, 330 F.3d at 295. 
 13. See id. at 294–95. 
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As a result, under what is now the controlling precedent in the 
Fifth Circuit, a city seeking to regulate off-site sexually oriented 
businesses must undertake the great expense of commissioning an 
entirely new study to prove the seemingly obvious: that an adult 
bookstore wedged between an elementary school and homes in a 
suburban neighborhood may result in negative secondary effects on 
the surrounding area, such as decreased property value. This is not 
the law as envisioned by the Supreme Court in Alameda Books. 
This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit’s approach 
properly interprets the Supreme Court by providing deference to 
cities at the initial stages of litigation while still ensuring that cities 
are ultimately not relying on “shoddy data or reasoning.”14 The Fifth 
Circuit has improperly interpreted the initial evidentiary burden a 
city must meet when proving secondary effects by forcing 
municipalities to differentiate between on- and off-site businesses. 
Although a city cannot rely on shoddy evidence in zoning adult 
businesses, the Supreme Court never meant to create such a high bar 
for cities to overcome in meeting their initial burdens.15 While the 
First Amendment rights of those owning and operating sexually 
oriented businesses are well established, the protection of those 
rights does not require an evidentiary burden so high that cities are 
unable to address potentially serious problems that may affect their 
citizens.16 
Part II.A of this Comment briefly outlines pornography’s rise in 
popularity and its current position within the American marketplace. 
Part II.B addresses how cities have used studies of adult businesses in 
zoning regulations and explains the differences between on- and off-
site sexually oriented businesses. Part III.A discusses the standard 
established by the Supreme Court in cases where zoning ordinances 
affect sexually oriented businesses, including the Court’s latest 
 
 14. Doctor John’s, 465 F.3d at 1165 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 
Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002) (plurality opinion)); see also id. at 1168–69. 
 15. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438 (specifically refusing to set a high bar for cities 
“that want to address merely the secondary effects of protected speech”); see also id. at 451 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[W]e have consistently held that a city must have latitude to 
experiment, at least at the outset, and . . . very little evidence is required.”). 
 16. See id. at 445 (“If a city can decrease the crime and blight associated with certain 
speech by the traditional exercise of its zoning power, and at the same time leave the quantity 
and accessibility of speech substantially undiminished, there is no First Amendment 
objection.”). 
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decision in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.17 Part III.B 
focuses on how this standard has been interpreted by the Tenth and 
Fifth circuits with regard to zoning ordinances regulating on- and 
off-site sexually oriented businesses. Part IV argues that the Tenth 
Circuit’s interpretation of the Supreme Court jurisprudence is 
correct because (A) the initial burden established by the Supreme 
Court is not exacting, (B) it allows for an appropriate level of 
deference to cities enacting ordinances, and (C) it allows for the 
consideration of the differences between different adult businesses at 
later stages of litigation. Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
II. THE RISE OF PORNOGRAPHY AND CITIES’ EFFORTS  
TO POLICE IT 
A. The Increased Popularity of Pornography 
The camera was invented in 1839 and within two years (and 
possibly sooner), it was used to take nude pictures in France.18 The 
creation and distribution of these pictures quickly became a 
commercial endeavor.19 Following a rough start in the United States 
where these images were largely outlawed during the nineteenth and 
early half of the twentieth centuries, pornography has continued to 
grow in popularity to its present status.20 Its phenomenal growth has 
encouraged the proliferation of distribution outlets, and thousands 
of eager entrepreneurs have stepped forward to meet the increasing 
demand for pornography.21 
Based on numbers alone, it seems Americans have a love affair 
with pornography.22 Steven Hirsch, one of the founding partners of 
 
 17. 535 U.S. 425. 
 18. See FREDERICK S. LANE III, OBSCENE PROFITS: THE ENTREPRENEURS OF 
PORNOGRAPHY IN THE CYBER AGE 41–46 (2001). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Indeed, the demand for pornography has even produced guidebooks to help eager 
consumers wade through the mountains of material and distribution outlets on the market 
today. See, e.g., J.P. DANKO, LIVE NUDE GIRLS: THE TOP 100 STRIP CLUBS IN NORTH 
AMERICA (1998); see also LANE, supra note 18, at 186–87 (discussing different guides available 
for sexually oriented businesses). 
 22. But not necessarily in High Definition. See Matt Ritchel, In Raw World of Sex 
Movies, High Definition Could Be a View Too Real, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/22/business/media/22porn.html?_r=1&oref=slogin 
(discussing the difficulties adult film makers encounter when filming in High Definition). 
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Vivid Entertainment, reported revenues in excess of $100 million last 
year based on sales of its adult videos, X-rated comic books, and a set 
of official Vivid Entertainment custom car wheels.23 And that is only 
the beginning. The pornography industry, once associated primarily 
with lonely trench coat-wearing customers looking both ways before 
ducking into an adult bookstore, has increasingly encroached into 
suburbia and now grosses nearly $14 billion annually,24 making it 
bigger than “professional football, basketball and baseball put 
together.”25 Not surprisingly, increased scrutiny and criticism26 have 
accompanied pornography’s foray into the lucrative mainstream, and 
cities have rushed to assure their residents that they will not have to 
worry about one of those establishments opening in their 
neighborhood.27 However, like political campaigning or religious 
proselytizing, pornography is constitutionally protected speech 
(although to a lesser extent).28 As a result, cities and municipalities 
across the nation now find themselves at a difficult crossroad, trying 
to appease their citizens’ cries that they run sexually oriented 
businesses out of town—or at least to the seedier fringes of town, far 
 
 23. Seth Lubove, Obscene Profits, FORBES, Dec. 12, 2005, at 99. In addition to films, 
Vivid lends it name out to “a vodka line, videogames, a Las Vegas night club, virility-
enhancement concoctions, X-rated comic books and even a set of custom car wheels.” Id. at 
100. 
 24. Frank Rich, Naked Capitalists, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2001, at 51, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D04E0DD173AF933A15756C0A9679C
8B63. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985) (arguing that pornography is one method used to maintain gender 
inequality). “What Pornography does goes beyond its content: It eroticizes hierarchy, it 
sexualizes inequality. It makes dominance and submission sex. Inequality is its central dynamic; 
the illusion of freedom coming together with the reality of force is central to its working.” Id. 
at 18 (emphasis in original). See also Gordon B. Hinckley, A Tragic Evil Among Us, LIAHONA, 
Nov. 2004 at 59–62 (leader of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints exhorting 
members to avoid pornography): 
Now brethren, the time has come for any one of us who is so involved to pull 
himself out of the mire, to stand above this evil thing, to “look to God and live.” 
We do not have to view salacious magazines. We do not have to read books laden 
with smut . . . we can do better than this. 
Id. at 62. 
 27. See, e.g., David M. Halbfinger, Adult Bookstore Roils Lindenhurst, N.Y. TIMES, July 
19, 1987, at A13; Mike Charbonneau, Tarboro Residents in Battle to Ban Adult Bookstore, Feb. 
12, 2008, http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/2428655/. 
 28. See Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“Sexual 
expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.”). 
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from schools, churches, and Costco—without running afoul of the 
First Amendment.  
B. The “Secondary Effects” Approach and the Studies That Drive It 
The erosion of society’s moral values and the debasement of 
women are not permissible grounds for a city to regulate 
pornography under the First Amendment. However, many cities and 
municipalities have successfully regulated sexually oriented businesses 
through zoning ordinances based on studies showing the presence of 
negative secondary effects in communities where adult businesses 
have chosen to locate.29 Some of the secondary effects recognized by 
the courts have included higher crime rates, a decline in real estate 
values, and overall neighborhood decline.30 
The Supreme Court has historically shown considerable 
deference to cities that make this determination, generally upholding 
ordinances that restrict the locations of sexually oriented businesses 
based on secondary effects so long as the municipality’s studies make 
an initial showing of a substantial government interest in 
regulation.31 In cases such as these, the Supreme Court employs a 
burden-shifting scheme whereby cities enacting zoning regulations 
affecting adult businesses must meet an initial evidentiary burden 
showing a substantial government interest in regulation of these 
businesses.32 The burden then shifts to the opponent of the 
regulation to “cast direct doubt on this rationale, either by 
demonstrating that the municipality’s evidence does not support its 
rationale or by furnishing evidence that disputes the municipality’s 
 
 29. See, e.g., LOS ANGELES, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. I, art. 2, § 12.70 (2007); BROWARD 
COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF BROWARD COUNTY ch. 20, art. XVI (1993); BROOKLYN PARK, 
MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 152.343 (2007); FALCON HEIGHTS, MINN., CITY CODE § 
113; KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 12, art. II (1998); OKLAHOMA CITY, 
OKLA., MUN. CODE §30-407 (2008); DALLAS, TEX., CODE § 41A-13 (2007); NEWPORT 
NEWS, VA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 45-524 (2007); LYNNWOOD, WASH., MUN. CODE § 
21.46.120 (2000); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 23.49.030 (2007). 
 30. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 430 (2002) 
(plurality opinion) (citing a study which indicated higher crime rates); City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 44 (1986) (discussing a statute which was enacted based 
on a concern about the “severe” effect of sexually oriented businesses on “surrounding 
businesses and residencies”); H & A Land Corp. v. City of Kennedale, 480 F.3d 336, 339–40 
(5th Cir. 2007) (examining a survey of real estate appraisers). 
 31. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438–39; Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 51–52; 
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976). 
 32. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438–39. 
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factual findings.”33 If the opponent succeeds in casting doubt 
through either method, the burden then shifts back to the 
municipality to “supplement the record with evidence renewing 
support for a theory that justifies its ordinance.”34 A critical part of 
this analysis is the city’s burden to show that sexually oriented 
businesses cause harmful secondary effects. Problematically, in some 
jurisdictions such studies must now survive a more rigorous standard 
of evidence.  
Therein lies the potential problem. 
Most studies undertaken to date—upon which cities across the 
country have relied to support regulations of sexually oriented 
businesses—treated sexually oriented businesses as one 
indistinguishable group.35 However, some jurisdictions now 
recognize a distinction between on- and off-site sexually oriented 
businesses. 
This distinction is based largely on where customers consume the 
adult products these businesses offer.36 On-site adult establishments 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., CITY OF AMARILLO, TEX., REPORT ON ZONING AND OTHER METHODS OF 
REGULATING ADULT ENTERTAINMENT IN AMARILLO (1977); CITY OF AUSTIN, TEX., REPORT 
ON ADULT ORIENTED BUSINESSES IN AUSTIN (1986); CITY OF DETROIT, MICH., DETROIT’S 
APPROACH TO REGULATING “ADULT” USES (1972); CITY OF KENT, WASH., CITY OF KENT 
ADULT USE ZONING STUDY (1982); CITY OF L.A., CAL., STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF THE 
CONCENTRATION OF ADULT ENTERTAINMENT ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE CITY OF LOS 
ANGELES (1977); CITY OF PHOENIX, ARIZ., RELATION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AND ADULT 
BUSINESSES (1979). 
 36. Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1166 (10th Cir. 2006). Another 
distinction courts must consider in this context, besides the classification of on-site or off-site, 
is whether an off-site business can be fairly classified as a sexually oriented business for purposes 
of zoning regulations. See, e.g., id. at 1154. It is relatively easy to say that the regulations 
should apply to a store that carries only adult videos and novelties; however, it is less clear for a 
shop that carries only a few novelty items on one of its shelves. Id. at 1158. The danger is that 
zoning regulations could apply to “[a] garden-variety book or music store[] with restricted 
adult sections,” such as a Barnes and Noble or a neighborhood magazine shop. Encore Videos, 
Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288, 294 n.7 (5th Cir. 2003). In addressing this 
problem, courts have consistently rejected ordinances that have classified stores with ten or 
twenty percent of their inventory dedicated to adult products as sexually oriented businesses. 
See, e.g., Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 352 F.3d 938, 939 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(clarifying the Fifth Circuit’s earlier decision, Encore Videos, 330 F.3d 288, to include that the 
statute in question was not narrowly tailored because of “its low 20% inventory requirement”); 
World Wide Video v. City of Tukwila, 816 P.2d 18, 21 (Wash. 1991) (invalidating an 
ordinance which regulated business devoting ten percent or more of their inventory to adult 
materials). Instead, only stores with “a significant or substantial portion of their stock or floor 
space” devoted to adult materials should be subject to these types of regulations. See Doctor 
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include businesses that allow patrons to view or experience the 
sexually oriented materials “on-site”—for example, strip clubs, 
pornographic theaters, or any adult business offering live 
entertainment or viewing booths.37 In contrast, off-site sexually 
oriented businesses, or “take home” adult businesses, sell sexually 
oriented “video tapes, DVD’s, magazines, and other print materials,” 
but do not allow the materials to be “viewed or consumed on the 
premises”—they must be taken “off-site.”38 The operative question 
now faced by courts across the country is whether this distinction 
matters when considering a city’s evidence under the standard set 
forth in Alameda Books.39  
 
John’s, 465 F.3d at 1154 (internal quotations omitted). For a discussion of the 
constitutionality of the above-quoted language, see id. at 1157–61. Limiting classification to 
only those businesses with a larger stock of adult materials is consistent with the very purpose 
behind adult business zoning regulations—curtailing negative secondary effects. See Playtime 
Theatres, 475 U.S. at 47. To meet constitutional scrutiny, zoning ordinances must be directed 
toward the secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses, and, thus, must be limited to 
those businesses that can be reasonably expected to produce these secondary effects. 
 37. H & A Land Corp. v. City of Kennedale, 480 F.3d 336, 338–39 (5th Cir. 2007). A 
viewing booth is commonly understood as a booth or small room provided by an adult 
business in which patrons may view pornographic videos or materials. 
 38. Id. at 338. 
 39. Bryant Paul, Daniel Linz, and Bradley Shafer argue that many of the studies used by 
cities in meeting their initial burden have not been required to adhere to “a set of 
methodological criteria or minimum standards” and, as such, cities may be “relying on flawed 
databases.” Bryant Paul, Daniel Linz & Bradley Shafer, Government Regulation of “Adult” 
Businesses Through Zoning and Anti-Nudity Ordinances: Debunking the Legal Myth of Negative 
Secondary Effects, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 355, 366 (2001). Paul, Linz, and Shafer argue that 
any studies used by cities should conform to the factors listed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), which dealt with determining the reliability of 
expert testimony, including “the notion of falsifiability, peer review and publication, error rate 
and adherence to professional standards.” Paul et al., supra. While this is an interesting 
argument, Alameda Books and its related cases have never required this type of evidence—
evidence to meet a city’s initial burden need only be “reasonably believed to be relevant” and 
“fairly support the municipalities’ rationale.” Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438 (quoting 
Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 51–52). Moreover, cities have successfully relied on such 
evidence, ranging from professional studies to citizen testimony. See, e.g., World Wide Video, 
Inc. v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004); Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 
44. Neither is it proper or necessary for the Court to adopt such a requirement in the future. 
As the case law stands now, the burden of casting doubt on a city’s reasoning rests on the 
plaintiff, who can point these problems out to the judge. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439. 
Requiring cities to use only studies complying with the Daubert standard would only serve to 
increase the cost of conducting studies and decrease a city’s flexibility to address problems 
reasonably linked to adult businesses. See Abilene Retail #30, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 492 F.3d 
1164, 1174 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Nor is there a constitutional requirement that the studies 
relied upon be empirical or satisfy any particular methodological or scientific standards—
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III. “SHODDY EVIDENCE?”: THE ALAMEDA BOOKS STANDARD AND 
ITS INTERPRETATION 
A. Content-Neutral Regulation and Alameda Books 
As a preliminary matter, in order to comply with the First 
Amendment, zoning ordinances aimed at regulating adult businesses 
must be “time, place, and manner regulations,” meaning that they 
are not aimed at the content of the speech but rather at the 
secondary effects of adult businesses on the surrounding 
community.40 In examining these “content-neutral”41 regulations, 
courts employ a standard of intermediate scrutiny through a burden-
shifting analysis.42 Under this analysis, cities have the initial burden 
of showing that a regulation is “designed to serve a substantial 
governmental interest and [does] not unreasonably limit alternative 
avenues of communication.”43 This section will address the three 
main cases the Supreme Court has considered that deal with zoning 
ordinances regulating sexually oriented businesses: Young v. 
American Mini Theaters, Inc.;44 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 
Inc.;45 and City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.46 The 
overarching theme of these cases, consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s lower standard of review, is the low initial burden of proof 
placed upon municipalities, along with the deference afforded to 
cities enacting these ordinances.47 
 
legislators are free to consider anecdotal evidence, statistical data, prior cases, and their 
common sense.”). 
 40. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 47. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439–40. This is a lower standard than strict scrutiny. In 
order for an ordinance to survive strict scrutiny the government must show “a compelling 
governmental interest in limiting speech, and the regulation must be narrowly drawn to 
achieve that interest.” 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 827 (2005). In addition, “the 
government must choose the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.” Id. 
(internal citations omitted). 
 43. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 47. 
 44. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
 45. 475 U.S. 41. 
 46. 535 U.S. 425. 
 47. Id. at 440 (“There is less reason to be concerned that municipalities will use these 
ordinances to discriminate against unpopular speech.”); see also id. at 449 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“As a matter of common experience, these sorts of ordinances are more like a 
zoning restriction on slaughterhouses and less like a tax on unpopular newspapers. The zoning 
context provides a built-in legitimate rationale, which rebuts the usual presumption that 
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1. Pre-Alameda Books cases 
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of 
zoning ordinances aimed at sexually oriented businesses in Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc.48 In 1972, the city of Detroit enacted a 
zoning ordinance prohibiting adult theaters from locating “within 
1,000 feet of any two other ‘regulated uses’ or within 500 feet of a 
residential area.” 49 The city heard evidence regarding the secondary 
effects of sexually oriented business and passed the ordinance in an 
effort to reduce these negative effects on the community.50 Two 
adult theaters in violation of the ordinance brought suit claiming 
that the regulation violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.51 Noting that “the city’s interest in attempting to preserve the 
quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect,”52 a 
majority of the Court held that the ordinance was a constitutional, 
content-neutral regulation because the evidence presented by the 
city—which demonstrated negative secondary effects—established a 
substantial government interest.53 
Ten years later, in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,54 the 
Court once again considered a zoning ordinance directed at sexually 
oriented businesses. Renton’s ordinance was similar to the zoning 
restrictions in Young in that it focused on regulating the location of 
adult theaters.55 The city originally considered the ordinance at the 
 
content-based restrictions are unconstitutional.”); Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 52 (“It is not 
our function to appraise the wisdom of the city’s decision . . . . [T]he city must be allowed a 
reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 48. 427 U.S. 50. 
 49. Id. at 52. Within the term “regulated use” the ordinance also included “10 different 
kinds of establishments in addition to adult theaters,” including “mini” theaters, adult 
bookstores, cabarets, bars, hotels and motels, pawnshops, pool halls, public lodging houses, 
secondhand stores, shoeshine parlors, and taxi dance halls. Id. at 52 n.3. 
 50. Id.; see also id. at 81 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring) (“That evidence consisted of 
reports and affidavits from sociologists and urban planning experts, as well as some laymen, on 
the cycle of decay that had been started in areas of other cities, and that could be expected in 
Detroit, from the influx and concentration of such establishments.”). 
 51. Id. at 55. 
 52. Id. at 71 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 80 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[There is 
no] doubt that the interests furthered by this ordinance are both important and substantial.”). 
 53. Id. at 72–73 (plurality opinion); id. at 82–84 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 54. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 55. Id. at 44. An adult theater was defined as “an enclosed building used for presenting 
motion picture films, video cassettes, cable television, or any such visual media, distinguished 
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urging of the mayor of Renton, and enacted the regulation in 
1981.56 The city council reviewed a number of studies concerning 
the secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses on surrounding 
communities in making its decision to enact the regulation.57  
Unlike Young, however, at the time Renton enacted its zoning 
ordinance there were no restricted businesses located within the 
city,58 and the city did not conduct any studies of its own. Instead, 
the municipality relied heavily on studies conducted in other 
municipalities.59 Two adult theater owners challenged the ordinance 
on constitutional grounds.60 Although the ordinance was upheld by 
the district court, upon review, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed.61 The appellate court reasoned that Renton had 
“improperly relied upon the experiences of other cities in lieu of 
evidence about the effects of adult theaters on Renton,” and, thus 
 
or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to specified sexual 
activities or specified anatomical areas . . . for observation by patrons therein.” Id. (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. The ordinance was “designed to prevent crime, protect the city’s retail trade, 
maintain property values, and generally protect and preserve the quality of the city’s 
neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life.” Id. at 48 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 58. Compare id. at 44 (illustrating the lack of such restricted businesses in the city) with 
Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 54–55 & n.8 (1976) (explaining that adult 
theaters and bookstores were added to the ordinance in response to a report concerning “the 
significant growth in the number of such establishments,” from two in 1967 to twenty-five in 
1972). 
 59. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 50–51. In particular, the City of Renton relied on 
studies produced by the City of Seattle, Washington, where, “as in Renton, the adult theater 
zoning ordinance was aimed at preventing the secondary effects caused by the presence of even 
one [adult] theater in a given neighborhood.” Id. at 50. In discussing the study, the Supreme 
Court quoted parts of a Washington State Supreme Court decision upholding the zoning 
ordinances based on these studies: 
  “The amendments to the City’s zoning code which are at issue here are the 
culmination of a long period of study and discussion of the problems of adult movie 
theatres in residential areas of the City . . . . [T]he City’s Department of Community 
Development made a study of the need for zoning controls of adult theatres . . . . 
The study analyzed the City’s zoning scheme, comprehensive plan, and land uses 
around existing adult motion picture theatres . . . .” 
Id. at 50–51 (quoting Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153, 1154–55 
(Wash. 1978)).  
 60. Id. at 45. 
 61. Id. at 43. 
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had failed to show the presence of a substantial government 
interest.62 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, holding 
that Renton had provided sufficient evidence to prove a substantial 
government interest.63 The Court stated that the Ninth Circuit had 
imposed “an unnecessarily rigid burden of proof” upon the city in 
requiring it to present studies “specifically relating to the particular 
problems or needs of Renton.”64 Instead, the Court held that “[t]he 
First Amendment does not require a city . . . to conduct new studies 
or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other 
cities, so long as . . . [the] evidence the city relies upon is reasonably 
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.”65 In 
justifying its ruling, the Court cited its earlier decision in Young 
holding that cities should have a “reasonable opportunity to 
experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.”66 
2. Alameda Books: A more rigorous standard? 
Despite the Court’s holding in Renton, the standard for proving 
a government interest remained unclear. Thus, in City of Los Angeles 
v. Alameda Books, Inc.,67 the Court expressly granted certiorari in 
order to “clarify the standard for determining whether an ordinance 
serves a substantial government interest” as established in Renton 
and Young.68 The ordinance at issue in Alameda Books was originally 
passed in 1978, based on a 1977 study conducted by the City of Los 
Angeles showing that “concentrations of adult businesses” were 
linked to higher crime rates in the surrounding communities.69 In an 
 
 62. Id. at 46. 
 63. Id. at 54–55 (“In sum, we find that the Renton ordinance represents a valid 
governmental response to the ‘admittedly serious problems’ created by adult theaters. Renton 
has not used ‘the power to zone as a pretext for suppressing expression,’ but rather has sought 
to make some areas available for adult theaters and their patrons, while at the same time 
preserving the quality of life in the community at large. . . . This, after all, is the essence of 
zoning.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 64. Id. at 50 (internal quotations omitted). 
 65. Id. at 51–52. 
 66. Id. at 52 (citing Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 67. 535 U.S. 425 (2002). 
 68. Id. at 433 (plurality opinion). 
 69. Id at 430–31. Specifically, the study showed an increase in “prostitution, robbery, 
assaults, and thefts in surrounding communities.” Id. at 430. 
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effort to disperse these businesses and decrease the cited negative 
secondary effects, the ordinance, like those at issue in Young and 
Renton, prohibited adult business from locating within a certain 
distance of residential areas or other sexually oriented businesses.70 
Shortly after passing the ordinance, however, the city realized that it 
contained “a loophole permitting the concentration of multiple adult 
enterprises in a single structure.”71 The city subsequently amended 
the ordinance in 1983, to prohibit “the establishment or 
maintenance of more than one adult entertainment business in the 
same building, structure or portion thereof.”72 
Two adult establishments—an adult bookstore and an adult 
arcade, both providing on-site entertainment73 and operating within 
the same commercial space—brought suit, challenging the 
ordinance’s constitutionality under the First Amendment.74 The 
district court granted summary judgment for the adult businesses 
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the city had not 
presented evidence “upon which it could reasonably rely to 
demonstrate a link between multiple-use adult establishments and 
negative secondary effects.”75 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 431. The actual language of the Code provided that “‘the distance between 
any two adult entertainment businesses shall be measured in a straight line . . . from the closest 
exterior structural wall of each business.’” Id. (quoting LOS ANGELES, CAL., MUN. CODE § 
12.70(D) (1978)). This language prevented two separately housed adult businesses from 
locating within the prohibited 1000 feet of one another. However, the language did not 
prevent two or more separate adult establishments from locating within the same building. 
Thus, under the language in effect in the original ordinance, adult businesses could group 
together in a sort of mini-mall or “department store” of adult businesses, which is exactly what 
happened in this case. Id. at 431–33. 
 72. Id. at 431 (citing LOS ANGELES, CAL., MUN. CODE § 12.70(C) (1983)). 
 73. Both businesses are properly classified as on-site sexually oriented businesses despite 
one being labeled an “adult bookstore” because both businesses allowed on-site consumption 
of adult materials by providing “booths where patrons [could] view videocassettes [on-site] for 
a fee.” See id. at 432. 
 74. Id. The Los Angeles ordinance defined an adult bookstore as “an operation that ‘has 
as a substantial portion of its stock-in-trade and offers for sale’ printed matter and 
videocassettes that emphasize the depiction of specified sexual activities.” Id. at 431 (citing 
LOS ANGELES, CAL., MUN. CODE § 12.70(B)(2)(a) (1983)). An adult arcade is defined as “an 
operation where, ‘for any form of consideration,’ five or fewer patrons together may view films 
or videocassettes that emphasize the depiction of specified sexual activities.” Id. at 431–32 
(citing LOS ANGELES, CAL., MUN. CODE § 12.70(B)(1)). 
 75. Id. at 429–30. 
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Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit,76 
finding that a city is not required to prove that its approach is the 
only valid response to the demonstrated secondary effects.77 The 
Court specifically “refused to set such a high bar for municipalities” 
attempting to meet their initial burdens by showing a substantial 
government interest.78 Instead the Court stated that, in meeting its 
initial burden, a city “may rely on any evidence that is ‘reasonably 
believed to be relevant’ for demonstrating a connection between 
speech and a substantial, independent government interest.”79 In 
providing this evidence, however, the Court cautioned that a city 
may not rely on “shoddy data or reasoning”; rather, the city’s 
evidence “must fairly support the municipality’s rationale for its 
ordinance.”80 Under the Court’s analysis, once the government 
proves a substantial government interest, the burden then shifts to 
the plaintiff to “cast direct doubt on this rationale,” by proving 
either the evidence does not support the city’s conclusions, or 
through evidence “[disputing] the municipality’s factual findings.”81 
If a plaintiff is successful in meeting this burden, the city must then 
“supplement the record with evidence renewing support for a theory 
that justifies its ordinance.”82 
Finally, the Court reiterated the maxim set down in Young and 
Renton that a city “must be given a ‘reasonable opportunity to 
experiment with solutions’ to address the secondary effects of 
protected speech.”83 The Court explained that, in some instances, a 
city may implement “an innovative solution,” and in such a situation 
a municipality would have no evidence to show the reliability of its 
proposed solution because it had never been implemented before.84 
 
 76. Id. at 430. 
 77. Id. at 438.  
 78. Id.; see also id. at 451–52 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[A] city must have latitude to 
experiment, at least at the outset. . . . [I]f its inferences appear reasonable, we should not say 
there is no basis for its conclusion.”). 
 79. Id. at 438 (plurality opinion) (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 
U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986)). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 438–39. 
 82. Id. at 439. 
 83. Id. (quoting Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 52). 
 84. Id. at 439–40. 
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In many cases, this would leave the city with “no means to address 
the secondary effects with which it is concerned.”85 
The consistent emphasis in Alameda Books and the cases 
preceding it is that the initial burden of proof placed on cities 
addressing negative secondary effects incident to adult businesses is 
not exacting. Indeed, the Court in its most recent decision took care 
to clarify that the initial bar is not high:86 cities can rely on evidence 
that is “reasonably believed to be relevant”87 as long as it is not 
“shoddy,” meaning it “fairly support[s] the municipality’s rationale 
for its ordinance.”88 This evidence can include studies conducted in 
other cities reasonably analogized to the current city’s situation.89 
B. Applying Alameda Books: Confusion Among the Circuits 
In the wake of the Alameda Books decision, the question 
currently vexing the Fifth and Tenth Circuits is whether a study that 
does not distinguish between different classes of sexually oriented 
businesses “fairly support[s] the [city’s] rationale for [an] ordinance” 
affecting off-site sexually oriented businesses.90 This section will 
 
 85. Id. at 440.  
 86. Id. at 438. 
 87. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 51. 
 88. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438. 
 89. See id. at 439–40; see also Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 51–52.  
 90. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438. Although the Eight Circuit, in ILQ Inv., Inc. v. 
City of Rochester, addressed this same question and held that the ordinance in question 
sufficiently showed a substantial government interest, this case was decided before Alameda 
Books and its admonition against shoddy evidence. ILQ Invs., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 
F.3d 1413, 1418 (8th Cir. 1994) (“So long as [an ordinance] affects only categories of 
businesses reasonably believed to produce at least some of the unwanted secondary effects, [a 
city] must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly 
serious problems.” (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976))). 
This question has also been considered by the Ninth Circuit in World Wide Video, Inc. v. City 
of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004). However, there the court chose not to decide 
whether an on- and off-site distinction was constitutionally relevant because the city provided 
sufficient evidence, including “studies, police records, and citizen testimony,” concerning the 
negative secondary effects associated with both on- and off-site sexually oriented businesses. Id. 
at 1197 (“[I]n this case we can assume, but need not decide, that the distinction between 
retail-only stores and stores with preview booths is constitutionally relevant.”). Because this 
decision only addresses the on- and off-site distinction in dicta it will not be addressed in this 
Comment. However, it is interesting to note that this court seems to hold the city to an even 
lower burden than the Tenth Circuit—specifically, the court uses the opinion of a pedodontist 
working near an off-site sexually oriented business concerning his own subjective observations. 
Id. Surely, if this evidence can be seen as reasonably relevant and fairly supporting a city’s 
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examine how each of these two circuits has interpreted the Supreme 
Court’s decisions and the reasoning behind each circuit’s 
interpretation. 
1. The Fifth Circuit 
The decision in Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio91 is the 
governing case law on this issue for the Fifth Circuit. Encore Videos 
examined a city ordinance passed by San Antonio in 1995, which 
prohibited “sexually oriented businesses from locating within 1,000 
feet of residential areas.”92 The city based its decision on evidence of 
negative secondary effects.93 The plaintiff—an owner of a sexually 
oriented retail video store that fell within the city’s definition of a 
sexually oriented business—brought suit under the First 
Amendment.94 
The district court granted summary judgment for San Antonio 
and the plaintiff appealed.95 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the 
ordinance under the standard set forth in Renton.96 The court agreed 
with the district court that the ordinance was content-neutral and 
served a substantial government interest.97 However, the Fifth 
Circuit reversed the district court as to the issue of whether the 
 
rationale, a properly conducted study that does not distinguish between different adult 
businesses will as well, absent evidence presented to the contrary. 
 91. 330 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 92. Id. at 290. 
 93. Id. at 294. The ordinance was enacted to “reduce the adverse secondary effects 
(such as increased crime and the reduction of property values) of sexually oriented businesses.” 
Id. 
 94. Id. at 290. The ordinance “[prohibited] sexually oriented businesses from being 
within 1000 feet of other sexually oriented businesses or residential areas, churches, schools, or 
parks.” Id. at 294. 
 95. Id. at 290. 
 96. Id. at 292. The court adds an additional prong, holding that the ordinance must be 
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.” Id. at 291 (quoting Frisby v. 
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988)). Although this is not specifically listed as a requirement in 
Renton, which stated that a regulation is acceptable if “designed to serve a substantial 
government interest,” the Court did expressly find that “the Renton ordinance is ‘narrowly 
tailored’ to affect only that category of theatres shown to produce the unwanted . . . effects.” 
Id. (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986)). Other 
decisions have supported the view that a time, place, and manner ordinance must be narrowly 
tailored. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989); Frisby, 487 U.S. at 
481; Doctor John’s Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1164 (10th Cir. 2006); Z.J. Gifts D-
2, L.L.C. v. City of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683, 688 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 97. Encore Videos, 330 F.3d at 292–93. 
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ordinance was narrowly tailored, holding that “in order to 
demonstrate that the ordinance is narrowly tailored,” the city had to 
show that the ordinance addressed the secondary effects at which it 
was aimed. 98 
The court reasoned that San Antonio’s ordinance was not 
narrowly tailored to address a substantial government interest for 
two reasons.99 First, the municipality had defined “sexually oriented 
business” too broadly to be justified by the evidence it offered in 
support of its actions.100 Second—and more importantly for our 
purposes—the ordinance applied equally to both on- and off-site 
sexually oriented businesses, but the studies that the ordinance relied 
upon for its evidentiary basis either “entirely excluded” off-site 
businesses or did “not differentiate the data collected” from that of 
their on-site counterparts.101 Reasoning that off-site sexually oriented 
businesses differed from on-site businesses because the customers 
“are less likely to linger in the area and engage in public alcohol 
consumption and other undesirable activities,” the court held that a 
city is required to present “at least some substantial evidence of the 
secondary effects” stemming from off-site sexually oriented 
businesses.102 The court stated that ruling otherwise may subject 
“even ordinary bookstores and video stores with adult sections” to 
regulation without evidence of secondary effects.103 In reaching this 
decision, the court argued that its holding was not contrary to the 
standard set forth in Alameda Books because, in that case, the city 
had presented more compelling evidence in the form of its own 
study supporting the ordinance at issue.104 
 
 98. Id. at 294. 
 99. A few months after its decision in Encore Videos, the court issued a clarifying opinion 
stating, in relevant part, that “the ordinance at issue was found not to be narrowly tailored 
because of both its failure to make an on-site/off-site distinction and its low 20% inventory 
requirement.” Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 352 F.3d 938, 939 (5th Cir. 
2003). 
 100. Encore Videos, 330 F.3d at 294. The ordinance applied to “any bookstore, novelty 
store, or video store that devotes over 20% of its inventory or floor space to sexually explicit 
materials.” Id. The court feared that this definition was so broad that it could apply “to many 
garden-variety book or music stores with restricted adult sections.” Id. at n.7. 
 101. Id. at 294–95. San Antonio relied on three studies of secondary effects: “one in 
Seattle, Washington, in 1989, another in Austin, Texas, in 1986, and the third in Garden 
Grove, California, in 1991.” Id. at 294. 
 102. Id. at 295. 
 103. Id. at 295–96. 
 104. Id. at 295 n.10. 
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2. The Tenth Circuit 
In Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy105 the Tenth Circuit 
considered this issue in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Alameda Books.106 In May 2001, the city of Roy, Utah, enacted an 
ordinance regulating sexually oriented businesses in an effort to 
address negative secondary effects.107 As evidence of these effects, the 
city included findings based on “case law, Congressional testimony, 
research papers, and various studies from other areas.”108 In 
response, Doctor John’s, a retail store that “stocks a variety of ‘adult’ 
products,”109 filed suit, alleging, among other things, that the 
ordinance was “not narrowly tailored to regulate only businesses that 
produce adverse ‘secondary effects.’”110 Specifically, Dr. John’s 
argued that “the studies cited in support of the Roy City ordinance 
do not consider businesses . . . that sell materials only for off-site 
consumption.”111 
In considering the ordinance, the court first held that, under 
Alameda Books, the city bears the initial “burden of providing 
 
 105. 465 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 106. It should be noted that the Tenth Circuit, in Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C. v. City of Aurora, 
had previously considered the issue of whether a city must provide independent evidence of the 
secondary effects of off-site businesses to justify a zoning ordinance affecting these businesses. 
136 F.3d 683, 687–90 (10th Cir. 1998). The court held that even if an off-site sexually 
oriented business is “a new type of adult business, it may not avoid time, place and manner 
regulation that has been justified by studies of the secondary effects of reasonably similar 
businesses.” Id. at 690 (quoting ILQ Invs., Inc., v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413, 1418 
(8th Cir. 1994)). Because this case was decided before Alameda Books, this Comment will not 
consider its rulings except as incorporated by the Tenth Circuit in Doctor John’s. 
 107. See Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1170–71 (D. Utah 
2004).  
 108. Doctor John’s, 465 F.3d at 1154. 
 109. Id. at 1153. Dr. John’s stocks a variety of goods ranging from “lingerie, swimwear, 
lotions, oils, games, roses, [and] stuffed animals” to “‘marital aids’ and ‘adult toys’ including 
‘vibrators,’ ‘dildos,’ and other masturbation toys, as well as videotapes, DVDs, magazines, and 
books . . . some explicitly sexual in nature.” Doctor John’s, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 1170 (internal 
citations omitted). The owner, John K. Coil, decided to open a store in Utah “based on the 
perceived need for pornography” in that state. Id. John recalls: 
I was in Los Angeles and I read the newspaper on a Sunday morning, and there was 
an article in there that said that the State of Utah had appointed an anti-porn czar. 
And I had never been to Utah before. I had no knowledge that Utah existed except 
seeing it on a map, but I thought to myself and said out loud to those people 
around me, “There’s some uptight people. They need a porn store.” 
Id. (quoting Deposition of John K. Coil at 19–20). 
 110. Doctor John’s, 465 F.3d at 1156. 
 111. Id. at 1164. 
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evidence of secondary effects.”112 The court explained that in 
meeting that burden “cities are entitled to rely, in part, on [an] 
‘appeal to common sense,’ rather than ‘empirical data,’ at least where 
there is no ‘actual and convincing evidence from plaintiffs to the 
contrary.’”113 However, the municipality could not use “shoddy data 
or reasoning”—it “must fairly support the municipality’s rationale 
for its ordinance.”114 The court then turned its attention to Doctor 
John’s contention that the city’s evidence must specifically show a 
link between off-site sexually oriented businesses and the cited 
secondary effects.115 
The court began by noting its previous decision in Z.J. Gifts D-2 
v. City of Aurora, where the Tenth Circuit had previously “rejected 
the on-site/off-site distinction as a basis for striking down an adult 
business ordinance.”116 In Z.J. Gifts, the court concluded that a 
sexually oriented business providing only off-site adult material was 
still subject to regulations “‘justified by studies of the secondary 
effects of reasonably similar businesses.’”117 The court reasoned that 
under this precedent, “the mere fact that the ordinance reaches off-
site as well as on-site businesses is insufficient” to hold the ordinance 
unconstitutional.118 However, Dr. John’s argued that Z.J. Gifts 
needed to be re-examined after Alameda Books, which increased “the 
initial burden that [a] City must meet to justify [an] ordinance.”119 
The court declined to adopt this view; instead, it reasoned that, 
under Alameda Books, “a city does not face a ‘high bar’ in meeting 
its initial obligation to show an ordinance is narrowly tailored,” and 
the standard requires only that the “[city’s] evidence ‘fairly supports’ 
its rationale.”120 Thus, the court interpreted Alameda Books as 
 
 112. Id. (quoting Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1197 n.8 (10th Cir. 
2003). 
 113. Id. at 1165 (quoting Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1199). 
 114. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 115. Id. at 1166–68. 
 116. Id. at 1167 (citing Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C. v. City of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683 (10th 
Cir. 1998)); see supra note 106 (discussing Z.J. Gifts and its on-site/off-site distinction). 
 117. Id. (citing Z.J. Gifts, 136 F.3d at 690). 
 118. Id. at 1167. 
 119. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 120. Id. at 1167–68 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 438 
(2002) (plurality opinion)). The court also cited Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in 
Alameda Books stating, “‘very little evidence is required’ to justify a secondary effects 
ordinance.” Id. at 1168 (quoting Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  
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allowing cities to rely on studies showing the “secondary effects of 
reasonably similar businesses.”121 However, the court did not go so 
far as to treat the on- and off-site distinction as irrelevant. Instead, 
the court ruled that 
although a city need not initially come forward with specific 
evidence of a connection between negative secondary effects and 
each precise type of business regulated under its ordinance, a 
plaintiff may be able to challenge a city’s rationale for its ordinance 
by pointing to evidence that its type of adult business (e.g., “off-
site”) is relevantly different than those types of businesses analyzed 
in the studies supporting the ordinance (e.g. “on-site”).122 
The court qualified this statement with the admonition that the 
party opposing the government would need to do more than 
“[s]imply stat[e] that off-site businesses are different from on-site 
businesses” to shift the burden of proof to the municipality.123 The 
court then remanded to the district court for a determination of 
whether Doctor John’s had presented evidence sufficient to cast 
doubt on the city’s evidence.124 
IV. MEETING THE INITIAL BURDEN: FOLLOWING  
THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
This section argues that the Tenth Circuit’s approach has 
correctly interpreted the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Under the 
Tenth Circuit’s standard, cities are not relying on “shoddy data or 
reasoning”125 when their ordinances are supported by studies 
showing the negative effects of “reasonably similar businesses.”126 
The distinction between different adult businesses should not be 
 
 121. Id. at 1167 (quoting Z.J. Gifts, 136 F.3d at 690). 
 122. Id. at 1168. Indeed, this is the very position that this Comment takes. Although the 
differences between these types of businesses should be taken into account, the differences 
should not determine a city’s ability to meet its initial burden in support of its ordinance. See 
infra Part IV. 
 123. Id. In the opinion, the court indicates that Dr. John’s had presented no evidence 
“showing that off-site [sexually oriented businesses] have materially different secondary effects 
that would call into question the studies relied upon by Roy City.” Id. 
 124. Id. at 1173. Upon remand the district found that Doctor John’s evidence was 
insufficient “to cast doubt on the City’s rationale or the factual basis behind the city of Roy’s 
sexually-oriented business ordinance.” Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, No. 1:03-cv-00081, 
2007 WL 1302757, slip opinion at *1 (D. Utah May 2, 2007). 
 125. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438. 
 126. Doctor John’s, 465 F.3d at 1167. 
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ignored; nevertheless, the burden to demonstrate the relevance of a 
distinction between different adult businesses should rest on the 
business that is challenging the act in the litigation process, rather 
than as part of a city’s initial burden. This approach will preserve the 
deference that the Supreme Court has shown to cities. 
Part A of this section will explain why the Tenth Circuit’s 
practice of allowing cities to rely on data gathered from reasonably 
similar adult businesses, instead of requiring separate evidence for 
each new type of adult business, is the correct interpretation of 
Alameda Books. Part B will show how this standard provides cities 
with the correct level of deference in dealing with the secondary 
effects attributable to various adult businesses, while still ensuring 
that a city’s initial burden does not constitute a rubber stamp. 
Finally, Part C will address when courts should consider the 
differences between different types of sexually oriented businesses. 
A. Showing a Substantial Government Interest: A City’s  
Initial Burden 
The Tenth Circuit’s standard, which allows cities to meet their 
initial burden by relying on studies of “reasonably similar 
businesses,”127 does not constitute Alameda Books’ prohibited 
reliance on “shoddy data or reasoning.”128 Rather, looking to 
“reasonably similar businesses” satisfies the initial burden set forth by 
the Supreme Court in Alameda Books and its predecessors. In its 
earlier decision in Renton, the Supreme Court held that, in meeting 
their initial burden, cities are not required to “produce evidence 
independent of that already generated by other cities, so long 
as [the] evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be 
relevant to the problem that the city addresses.”129 Repeating this 
standard, the Alameda Books Court specifically refused to raise the 
initial burden a city faces any higher than in Renton, adding only 
that the evidence must “fairly support the municipality’s rationale for 
its ordinance”130—a very low initial burden to meet. 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438. 
 129. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986) (emphasis 
added). 
 130. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438. Although this is a plurality opinion, Justice 
Kennedy agreed that the plurality gave “the correct answer” to the amount of evidence needed 
to meet a city’s initial burden in justifying an ordinance affecting sexually oriented businesses 
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The Court does not even require that a study actually be 
relevant, just that the city “reasonably believe[s]” that it is.131 
Relevance only requires that the evidence have “any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence . . . more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”132 
A study showing negative effects of a similar adult business is 
certainly a relevant fact, or at the very least, a city can reasonably 
believe it to be relevant. Additionally, evidence of secondary effects 
incident to one type of adult business fairly supports an inference by 
cities that similar businesses may produce similar effects. The Tenth 
Circuit’s allowance of reasonable reliance by cities properly complies 
with the standard set forth by the Supreme Court. 
The facts of prior Supreme Court decisions support the view that 
the Tenth Circuit’s standard does not constitute a reliance on 
“shoddy data or reasoning,” as prohibited by Alameda Books. 
Although the Supreme Court has never expressly used the language 
“reasonably similar businesses,” its decisions up to this point have 
nevertheless applied such a standard. For example, in Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc.133 the Court allowed a municipality to rely on evidence 
showing a correlation between adult theaters and harmful secondary 
effects “to support its claim that nude dancing,” a reasonably similar 
business, was “likely to produce the same effects” as an adult 
theater.134 Similarly, the Court’s decision in Renton, allowing a city 
to rely on studies conducted in other cities, supports the Tenth 
Circuit’s doctrine. The Court allowed the city of Renton to make the 
reasonable inference, based on studies of adult business in other 
cities, that similar adult businesses in its own city would produce 
similar secondary effects.135 
The Court’s decision to reverse the Ninth Circuit in Alameda 
Books is another example where the Court allowed a municipality to 
rely on studies of reasonably similar businesses without actually 
stating it was doing so. The Ninth Circuit originally invalidated the 
ordinance at issue in Alameda Books because it found that the city 
 
and also stated himself that “at least at the outset, . . . very little evidence is required.” Id. at 
449, 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 131. Id. at 438. 
 132. FED. R. EVID. 401 (emphasis added). 
 133. 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
 134. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438 (explaining Barnes). 
 135. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986). 
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could not reasonably rely on a study showing the secondary effects of 
a concentration of separately housed adult businesses but not the 
effects of “a concentration of adult operations within a single adult 
establishment,” to justify an ordinance regulating such 
establishments.136 In essence, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the 
ordinance because it regulated one type of adult business based on a 
study showing the negative secondary effects associated with similar 
adult businesses. The Supreme Court overruled this decision, 
effectively holding that it is reasonable for cities to draw inferences 
from studies concerning reasonably similar adult businesses.137 While 
cities cannot “get away with shoddy data or reasoning,” a 
municipality’s evidence must simply “fairly support [its] rationale.”138 
Thus, although the Supreme Court has not expressly stated that 
cities can rely on studies of “reasonably similar businesses,” the 
Tenth Circuit’s standard, which allows such reliance, is the correct 
interpretation of Alameda Books. 
Like the reversed Ninth Circuit decision in Alameda Books, the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio139 
sets the initial burden a city must meet too high by requiring direct 
evidence of the negative secondary effects of the specific type of adult 
businesses being regulated. The Fifth Circuit invalidated the 
ordinance at issue in Encore Videos because the studies used to justify 
the ordinance either did not include off-site businesses or failed to 
differentiate the data collected from on-site businesses.140 It justified 
this decision by reasoning that “[i]f consumers of pornography 
cannot view the materials at the sexually oriented establishment, they 
[will be] less likely to linger in the area and engage in public alcohol 
 
 136. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 436; see also Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los 
Angeles, 222 F.3d 719, 725 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Los Angeles has presented no evidence that a 
combination adult bookstore/arcade produces any of the harmful secondary effects identified 
in the Study. . . . [T]he 1977 study [] contains no findings that an individual combination 
bookstore/arcade produces any of the increased crime the Study found resulting from a 
concentration of adult businesses. Therefore, it is unreasonable for the City to infer that absent 
its regulations, a bookstore/arcade combination would have harmful secondary effects.”). 
 137. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 436 (holding that it was reasonable “for Los Angeles to 
suppose that a concentration of adult establishments is correlated with high crime rates because 
a concentration of operations in one locale draws, for example, a greater concentration of adult 
consumers to the neighborhood, and a high density of such consumers either attracts or 
generates criminal activity”). 
 138. Id. at 438. 
 139. Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 140. Id. at 294–95.  
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consumption and other undesirable activities.”141 Thus, their 
argument was that off-site sexually oriented businesses are “less likely 
to create harmful secondary effects,” so zoning ordinances regulating 
them cannot be justified absent direct evidence of these effects.142 
While the Fifth Circuit’s argument is reasonable, it is simply not 
a proper consideration for cities in meeting their initial burden under 
Alameda Books, which requires only that a city’s evidence “fairly 
support [its] rationale for its ordinance[s]” by evidence “reasonably 
believed to be relevant.”143 Even if these secondary effects are less, it 
is reasonable, absent evidence to the contrary, to believe that off-site 
businesses have enough effects in common with on-site businesses to 
create a substantial government interest in regulating them.144 
Although the Fifth Circuit attempted to argue that their decision was 
not contrary to Alameda Books,145 the city in Alameda Books did not 
provide direct evidence in support of its ordinance but instead relied 
upon reasonable inferences that the city’s evidence would support its 
regulation. Encore Videos should have been no different. A city may 
make reasonable inferences between similar businesses in meeting its 
initial burden. 
Under the Tenth Circuit’s standard, which allows reliance upon 
studies of “reasonably similar businesses” in meeting a city’s initial 
burden,146 the outcome of Encore Videos likely would have been 
different. The ordinance at issue in the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
 
 141. Id. at 295. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438 (citation omitted). 
 144. See H & A Land Corp. v. City of Kennedale, 480 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2007), 
for a recent example. In this case, the court found that some negative effects relating to real 
estate value accompanied adult businesses equally, regardless of an on- or off-site classification: 
[T]he Indianapolis survey also asked respondents to explain their prediction that an 
adult bookstore would negatively impact property value: 29% believed such an 
establishment would attract ‘undesirables’ to the neighborhood, 14% felt it would 
create a bad image of the area, and 15% felt that it offended prevailing community 
attitudes. These reasons are equally applicable to an on-site or off-site establishment, 
and are distinguishable from the problems we have found to be unique to on-site 
businesses.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 145. Encore Videos, 330 F.3d at 295–96 n.10 (“The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Alameda Books is not to the contrary. . . . Clearly, that study, unlike the studies presented in 
this case, directly supported the specific regulation at issue in [that case].”). 
 146. Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1166 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C. v. City of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683, 690 (10th Cir. 1998)). 
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Encore Videos relied on three studies from other cities: Seattle, 
Washington; Austin, Texas; and Garden Grove, California.147 The 
court did not mention any flaws with the studies themselves or state 
that the studies did not adequately show a correlation between on-
site sexually oriented businesses and negative secondary effects. The 
court gave only one reason for why these studies were insufficient: 
one did not include off-site adult businesses and the other two did 
not differentiate between data collected from on-site businesses and 
their off-site cousins—even though the Austin study included 
information from two adult bookstores.148 Given that “very little 
evidence is required”149 to meet its initial burden, it would seem 
reasonable for a city to believe, based on these studies, that 
businesses selling the same sorts of material and dealing with the 
same subject matter as their on-site counterparts would generate 
some of the same secondary effects. In the absence of evidence 
 
 147. Encore Videos, 330 F.3d at 294. 
 148. Id. at 294–95, 295 n.9. Opponents of zoning ordinances often contend that studies, 
which at first blush appear to include off-site businesses, do not actually support a city’s initial 
burden because—within the “adult industry”—the terms used in these studies are understood 
as applying to on-site instead of off-site establishments. See H & A Land Corp., 480 F.3d at 
340 (“[B]ookstore . . . is a term of art and does not sufficiently specify off-site premises. . . . 
[I]nstead . . . adult bookstores often include peep shows, arcades, and other forms of on-site 
entertainment, rendering them on-site establishments.”); Z.J. Gifts, 136 F.3d at 687 (“Z.J. 
Gifts argues and attempts to prove that all other adult bookstores provide some form of on-
premises viewing of sexually explicit materials.”); ILQ Invs., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 
1413, 1418 n.5 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting the owner of a sexually oriented business stating that 
“on-premise viewing booths” were “an absolute essential component of the 70 adult 
bookstores in 25 states that he [had] personally visited.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Grappling with this issue while still abiding by its precedent, the Fifth Circuit recently rejected 
the argument that “adult bookstore” is a term of art implying an on-site business, and upheld a 
zoning ordinance affecting off-site adult businesses because it was based on studies, which 
“included surveys of real estate appraisers that focused strictly on ‘adult bookstores.’” H & A 
Land Corp., 480 F.3d at 339–40 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that whether the 
survey included off-site establishments or was limited to consideration of on-site businesses 
depended largely on how the real estate agents would understand the term “adult bookstore.” 
Id. Then, pointing to the common dictionary definition of “bookstore,” instead of the 
specialized definition offered by sexually oriented businesses, the court concluded it was 
“reasonable for [the city] to believe” that those participating in the survey “understood the 
term ‘adult bookstore’ to mean off-site businesses.” Id. at 340. Thus, while the Fifth Circuit 
has set the city’s initial burden higher than the Supreme Court contemplated for cities, it has 
correctly refused to adopt the specialized definition of “adult bookstore” in connection to 
secondary effect studies. 
 149. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 451 (2002) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
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showing otherwise, it is likely that these studies “fairly support the 
municipality’s rationale.”150 
B. Deference: Dealing with a “New Type” of Adult Business 
The hypothetical outcome in Encore Videos discussed above 
would also have been entirely consistent with the level of deference 
cities receive in meeting their initial burden under the Supreme 
Court’s standard. Throughout its opinions on this issue, the 
Supreme Court has emphasized that “a city’s ‘interest in attempting 
to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded 
high respect.’”151 The Court provides a high level of deference to 
allow cities to use their “zoning power in a reasonable way to 
ameliorate [secondary effects] without suppressing speech.”152 
However, the Fifth Circuit’s requirement that a city provide “some 
substantial evidence of secondary effects specific to” each type of 
regulated adult business in meeting its initial burden, does not take 
into account the deference that the Supreme Court has attempted to 
provide cities.153 As a result, if followed, the Fifth Circuit’s standard 
will substantially limit a city’s ability to deal with new types of adult 
businesses in the future. 
In light of the Fifth Circuit’s current standard, there is no doubt 
that cities are now attempting to find or conduct studies that include 
off-site businesses to support their ordinances, and some already have 
found such studies.154 However, the Fifth Circuit’s holding has the 
potential to stretch beyond its current application to off-site 
businesses by allowing an adult business, wishing to dispute an 
otherwise valid zoning ordinance, to claim that it is simply a 
“‘different kind’ of adult business” not covered in the existing 
studies justifying the ordinance.155 It is unlikely that for each 
“different kind of adult business” there will be sufficient 
differentiated evidence readily available for cities to cite. A city will 
 
 150. Id. at 438 (plurality opinion). 
 151. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) (quoting Young 
v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (plurality opinion)); see also Alameda 
Books, 535 U.S. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 152. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 444. 
 153. Encore Videos, 330 F.3d at 295. 
 154. See, e.g., H & A Land Corp., v. City of Kennedale, 480 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 155. Doctor John’s v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1165 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1199 (10th Cir. 2003)). 
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therefore have to conduct its own study or simply wait to address 
potentially serious problems until another city conducts a study upon 
which it can rely. The sheer cost of conducting these studies will 
effectively prevent smaller cities like Kennedale, Texas, with an 
estimated population of 6450 people,156 or Roy, Utah—population 
35,100157—from enacting ordinances to address secondary effects. 
Even larger cities like Los Angeles, which boasts a modest estimate 
of 9,948,081 residents,158 will encounter difficulties paying for new 
studies for each “new type” of adult business.159 It is for this very 
reason that the Supreme Court has maintained such a low initial 
burden allowing a municipality to rely on the experiences of other 
cities “if its inferences appear reasonable.”160 
Additionally, even if a city could afford to conduct one or two 
studies to address new types of adult businesses, the Fifth Circuit’s 
standard imposes no limit to the distinctions that an adult business 
can employ to claim it is a “new type” of adult business. Once 
enough cities have conducted research showing the negative 
secondary effects of off-site businesses, the controversy will not end. 
Instead, adult-business owners will likely attempt to distinguish their 
businesses in other ways in order to escape legitimate zoning 
ordinances. For example, a strip club or topless bar that caters only 
to high-class customers or business types will not attract the seedier 
customers, and thus the owner could claim that the secondary effects 
are fewer than another adult establishment. An adult bookstore 
 
 156. City of Kennedale, Texas Web site, About Kennedale, http:// 
www.gokennedale.com/admin/contentx/default.cfm?PageId=8505 (last visited Oct. 28, 
2008). 
 157. U.S. Census Bureau, Roy (city) QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/ 
states/49/4965110.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008). 
 158. U.S. Census Bureau, Los Angeles County QuickFacts, http:// 
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06037.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008). 
 159. Just a few short years ago, California faced major budget crises that ultimately 
resulted in a recall election in which Arnold Schwarzenegger was elected. See, e.g., Charlie 
LeDuff, The California Recall: The Governor-elect; A Sudden, Decisive Victory for a Newcomer to 
Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at A26; Hal R. Varian, Economic Scene; California’s Long-
term Economic Problems Need Long-term Solutions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003, at C2. 
However, even the power of “the Terminator” (Schwarzenegger) has not been able to fend off 
continuing crises with California’s budget. See, e.g., Matthew Yi, Budget Bombshell: Governor 
Boosts Deficit Forecast to $20 Billion as He Bids to Change State’s Spending System, S.F. CHRON., 
Apr. 30, 2008, at A1. 
 160. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 452 (2002) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
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owner who only deals in soft-core pornography could argue that the 
bookstore creates fewer secondary effects than bookstores carrying 
hard-core pornography. A strictly gay adult bookstore might claim 
different secondary effects than a store offering a wider variety of 
products. Or the owner of a topless bar where pasties are worn might 
contend that the business is responsible for fewer secondary effects 
than a fully nude strip club. The distinctions can be almost endless 
for a creative mind, and under the Fifth Circuit’s standard, a city will 
have to find “at least some substantial evidence of the secondary 
effects” specific to these new establishments before their regulations 
can apply.161 The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of Alameda Books, 
allowing cities to rely on studies of “reasonably similar businesses” in 
meeting their initial burden, makes more sense for cities, especially in 
light of the Supreme Court’s efforts to give deference to cities’ 
ability to zone and regulate adult businesses. 
The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the Alameda Books 
standard maintains a lower bar for cities attempting to meet their 
initial burden of evidence; however, it does not constitute a rubber 
stamp but ensures that cities are not relying on “shoddy data or 
reasoning.”162 In Abilene Retail #30, Inc. v. Board of 
Commissioners,163 the Tenth Circuit reversed a district court’s ruling 
in favor of a rural county because there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether it met its initial burden when it enacted a 
zoning ordinance affecting an adult bookstore.164 However, this 
decision was not based on the sufficiency of studies relied on by the 
city, but rather because city officials changed the required distance 
between sexually oriented businesses and private residences from 750 
feet to 1200 feet after discovering in a public meeting that 750 feet 
would not force the only sexually oriented business in town to 
move.165 The court stated that the “[o]rdinance plainly contemplates 
the closure of [the adult business] in its existing location, a location 
that a common sense reading of the Board’s studies suggests would 
best limit any secondary effects.”166 Under these facts the court was 
 
 161. Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288, 295 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 162. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438. 
 163. 492 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 164. Id. at 1167. 
 165. Id. at 1169. The adult business (The Lion’s Den) was actually 1150 feet from the 
nearest home, next to the interstate. 
 166. Id. at 1177. 
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concerned that city officials had not “reasonably relied on studies 
analyzing the secondary effects of adult businesses.”167 A city can rely 
on studies of reasonably similar businesses, but the studies must 
“‘fairly support[]’ its rationale.”168 
C. A Different Kind of Adult Business: Proper Consideration of the 
Off-Site Distinction 
Finally, while the city’s initial burden of proof does not require 
consideration of the distinction between on- and off-site businesses, 
this does not mean that the distinction should—or even can—be 
ignored. Under the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of Alameda Books, 
the on- and off-site distinction is properly considered once a city has 
met its initial burden of support for its ordinance and the burden has 
passed to the plaintiff.169 Specifically, the Tenth Circuit maintained 
that an opponent of a zoning ordinance can come forward with 
evidence showing that a “type of adult business (e.g., ‘off-site’) is 
relevantly different than those types of businesses analyzed in the 
studies supporting the ordinance (e.g., ‘on-site’).”170 However, 
unlike the Fifth Circuit’s standard, an opponent’s naked assertion 
“that off-site businesses are different from on-site businesses is not 
sufficient to shift the burden back to the city.”171 Rather, opponents 
must present evidence supporting their claims. Once a plaintiff has 
presented evidence that casts direct doubt on a city’s rationale, the 
burden will shift back to the city to provide further substantial 
evidence that off-site businesses cause the negative secondary effects 
at issue.172 
Considering the distinction between on- and off-site sexually 
oriented businesses later in the burden-shifting scheme is consistent 
with Alameda Books and its policies. While the Alameda Books Court 
has cautioned that cities cannot rely on “shoddy” evidence in 
justifying an ordinance, the Court never meant to raise the initial bar 
that a city must meet. The Tenth Circuit’s practice of putting the 
 
 167. Id. at 1167. 
 168. Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1167–68 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002) (plurality 
decision)). 
 169. Id. at 1168. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439. 
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burden on opponents to “cast doubt on [a municipality’s] evidence 
and rationale”173 is consistent with the Supreme Court’s policy of 
“deference to the evidence presented by the city” and its 
acknowledgement that “cities are ‘in a better position than the 
Judiciary to gather and evaluate data on local problems.’”174 As such, 
the burden of proving that a study relied upon by a city improperly 
attributed on-site secondary effects to off-site businesses should rest 
on the sexually oriented business challenging the ordinance. 
The Supreme Court’s admonition against “shoddy” evidence 
does not mean that it is necessary for a city, when meeting its initial 
burden of proof by showing a substantial government interest, to 
provide studies specifically addressing the secondary effects of off-site 
sexually oriented business or any other type of new adult business for 
that matter. Rather, as the Tenth Circuit stated in Doctor John’s, a 
city can rely on evidence, which, while not directly supporting the 
rationale behind the city’s ordinance, is nevertheless based on studies 
concerning reasonably similar businesses.175 Requiring otherwise is 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Alameda Books 
and will unnecessarily impede good faith efforts by city councils, as 
well as undermine a municipality’s latitude to “experiment with 
solutions to admittedly serious problems,” in addressing the 
secondary effects of different types of sexually oriented businesses.176 
Proper consideration of the differences between reasonably similar 
adult businesses should not be ignored, but it must not become part 
of a city’s initial burden of proving a substantial government interest. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Like it or not, the adult entertainment industry is here to stay. 
While the owners and operators of establishments catering to the 
demands generated by this business have legitimate rights under the 
First Amendment, municipalities must also be free to respond to 
negative secondary effects that are incident to these types of 
operations. The Supreme Court has recognized this need and 
protected a city’s ability to enact content-neutral zoning ordinances 
 
 173. Doctor John’s, 465 F.3d at 1169. 
 174. Id. at 1168 (quoting Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 440). 
 175. Id. at 1150. 
 176. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Young v. Am. 
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976)). 
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aimed at reducing these secondary effects. Nevertheless, the Fifth 
Circuit has improperly interpreted the initial evidentiary burden that 
a city must meet in justifying these ordinances. Although a city 
cannot rely on “shoddy” evidence when enacting such ordinances, 
the Supreme Court’s standard does not require municipalities, in 
meeting their initial burden, to find or conduct new studies each 
time an affected adult business claims that it is a new or different 
kind of sexually oriented business. Rather, as the Tenth Circuit 
holds, cities must be allowed to rely on “studies of the secondary 
effects of reasonably similar businesses.”177 While distinctions 
between different adult businesses are important considerations, they 
are properly considered after the city has met its initial burden of 
proof and the plaintiff has provided evidence that casts doubt upon 
the city’s rationale. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit’s approach, which 
defers consideration of the on- and off-site distinction until later 
stages of litigation, properly interprets the Supreme Court’s standard 
by providing initial deference to cities while still ensuring that they 
are not ultimately relying on “shoddy data or reasoning.”178 
Brigman L. Harman 
 
  
 
 177. Doctor John’s, 465 F.3d at 1167 (quoting Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C. v. City of Aurora, 
136 F.3d 683, 690 (10th Cir. 1998)). 
 178. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002) (plurality decision). 
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